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WINSTON CHURCHILL ON THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA† 
I am not a lawyer, but I have obeyed a lot of laws, and 
helped to make a few.1 
— Winston S. Churchill 
Though best known for leading Britain during World War II, 
Winston Churchill was a keen observer of constitutional law.2  
Most of his insights concerned the unwritten conventions of the 
British Constitution,3 but Churchill also commented extensively 
on the American Constitution.4  Intellectual curiosity and a de-
sire to forge a closer alliance between Great Britain and the 
United States were at the root of Churchill’s interest in the 
institutions of what he called “The Great Republic.”5  As with all 
things Churchill, his observations on our Constitution were 
sometimes inspiring, sometimes illuminating, and sometimes 
noxious.6  
 
† Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law, Indiana Robert H. McKinney School of 
Law. My thanks to Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Richard Primus, and Amanda Tyler 
for their comments on drafts. 
1 Winston S. Churchill, America and Britain (Apr. 7, 1954), in 8 WINSTON S. 
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897–1963, at 8559, 8559 (Robert Rhodes 
James ed., 1974) [hereinafter CHURCHILL SPEECHES] (accepting an Honorary 
Doctorate of Law from the Board of Regents of the State University of New York). 
2 There are many books about Churchill’s life, though in my opinion the best 
single-volume biography from a British perspective is ROY JENKINS, CHURCHILL: A 
BIOGRAPHY (2001).  
3 See, e.g., KEVIN THEAKSTON, WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE BRITISH 
CONSTITUTION (2004).  
4 See, e.g., Winston Churchill, What Good’s a Constitution?, COLLIER’S WEEKLY, 
Aug. 22, 1936), at 22, 39–40. 
5 See, e.g., WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF AMERICA, 
at XV (Winston S. Churchill ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE GREAT REPUBLIC] (noting 
that Churchill often referred to America as The Great Republic); The English-
Speaking Peoples (Mar. 8, 1946), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7293–
94 (calling Virginia “a cradle of the Great Republic”). The fact that Churchill’s 
mother, Jennie Jerome, was American may also have been a factor. See THE GREAT 
REPUBLIC, supra, at IX. 
6 Compare Their Finest Hour (June 18, 1940), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, at 6231, 6238 (“Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or 
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This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of 
Winston Churchill’s views on American constitutional law.  In his 
multi-volume A History of the English Speaking Peoples, Chur-
chill discussed the drafting and the ratification of the Constitu-
tion in detail.7  In a series of op-eds and magazine articles based 
on his trips to the United States, Churchill brought his acute 
political sense to bear on the operation of the Constitution during 
Jim Crow, Prohibition, and the New Deal.8  And in speeches to 
British and American audiences over many decades, Churchill 
frequently turned to our Constitution as both a model and a foil.9  
 
lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the 
world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole 
world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, 
will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more 
protracted, by the lights of perverted science.”), with A Seditious Middle Temple 
Lawyer (Feb. 23, 1931), in 5 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 4982, 4985 (“It 
is alarming and also nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious Middle Temple 
lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well-known in the East, striding half-naked 
up the steps of the Vice-regal palace, while he is still organizing and conducting a 
defiant campaign of civil disobedience, to parley on equal terms with the 
representative of the King-Emperor. Such a spectacle can only increase the unrest in 
India and the danger to which white people there are exposed.”).  
7 See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 3 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
PEOPLES: THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 210–14 (1957) [hereinafter AGE OF REVOLUTION]. 
Churchill was a prolific author and won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953. The 
following quote from Churchill captures why I love what I do:  
The fortunate people in the world—the only really fortunate people in the 
world, in my mind,—are those whose work is also their pleasure. The class 
is not a large one, not nearly so large as it is often represented to be; and 
authors are perhaps one of the most important elements in its com-
position. . . . Whether a man writes well or ill, has much to say or little, if 
he cares about writing at all, he will appreciate the pleasures of 
composition. To sit at one’s table on a sunny morning, with four clear hours 
of uninterruptible security, plenty of nice white paper, and 
a . . . pen. . . . that is true happiness. The complete absorption of the mind 
upon an agreeable occupation—what more is there than that to desire? 
The Joys of Writing (Feb. 17, 1908), in 1 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 903, 
903. 
8 See Winston S. Churchill, What I Saw in America of Prohibition, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 1929), at 10 [hereinafter Prohibition]; Winston S. Churchill, The 
Constitutions of Great Britain and the United States, DAILY MAIL (June 6, 1935), at 
12 [hereinafter Constitutions of Britain and the United States]. 
9 Compare Parliament Bill (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, 7563, 7565 (arguing against the curtailment of the House of Lords’ power to 
delay legislation by citing that “[t]he American Constitution, with its checks and 
counterchecks, combined with its frequent appeals to the people, embodied much of 
the ancient wisdom of this island”), with America and Britain, supra note 1, at 8559 
(“[I]t is a fact that American law is more wedded to the older versions of English law 
than is the case in Britain, where in the first half of the nineteenth century a great 
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From these rich sources, three relevant themes emerge for 
modern jurisprudence and constitutional design.  First, Churchill 
emphasized the continuity between British tradition and the 
great eighteenth-century texts written here, most notably in his 
innovative claim that the Declaration of Independence was the 
supreme articulation of the common law.10  Second, Churchill 
argued that judicial review was essential in the United States 
due to its unusual diversity—an explanation that challenges 
James Madison’s analysis of factions in Federalist No. 10.11  
Third, Churchill contended that the failures of the Fifteenth and 
Eighteenth Amendments—Black voting and Prohibition—during 
the 1920s were the result of a supermajority with good intentions 
enacting broad changes that were too unequally spread across 
society to sustain their enforcement.12  His hard-headed realism 
about how lopsided effects in constitutional law can cripple its 
authority even when reforms have supermajority backing is a 
lesson that should receive more attention, in part because that 
lesson can help to justify some of the antimajoritarian aspects of 
our constitutional structure. 
Part I of this Article examines Churchill’s views on 
constitutionalism and the parallels that he drew between the 
legal principles of Britain and America.  Part II explores the 
 
deal of technical modernization was effected. Although I like old things better than 
new, I believe our revised version has many conveniences in procedure.”). 
10 See, e.g., “The Third Great Title-Deed” of Anglo-American Liberties (July 4, 
1918), in 3 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 2613, 2614 [hereinafter Third 
Great Title-Deed] (hailing the Declaration of Independence as a common-law 
landmark comparable to the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights). 
11 See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40; Liberty and the Law 
(July 31, 1957), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, 8682, 8683; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 64–65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see infra 
text accompanying notes 113–121. 
12 See Prohibition, supra note 8; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right 
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (“After one year from the ratification of this article 
the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the im-
portation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all 
territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby 
prohibited.”), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth article of 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.”); Shelby 
Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536 (2013) (describing the impotence of the Fifteenth 
Amendment until 1965); cf. Guido Calabresi, Foreword, Antidiscrimination and 
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 80, 130–31 (1991) (making some related points about disparate impact and 
judicial review). 
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evolution of Churchill’s thought on a crucial difference between 
these kindred systems—judicial review—and his hypothesis that 
diversity explains the distinction.  Finally, Part III focuses on 
Churchill’s attack on Prohibition and his surprising connection of 
that failure to the establishment of a central pillar of Jim Crow. 
I.  A COMMON CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE 
In an address to a joint session of Congress a few weeks after 
the United States declared war on Nazi Germany, Churchill de-
clared: “I have been in full harmony all my life with the tides 
which have flowed on both sides of the Atlantic against privilege 
and monopoly, and I have steered confidently towards the 
Gettysburg ideal of ‘government of the people by the people for 
the people.’ ”13  This Part looks at Churchill’s constitutional beliefs 
and his rhetoric stressing the bonds between British and 
American democracy in furtherance of that alliance.  The most 
striking example was his claim that the Declaration of Indepen-
dence is one of these bonds rather than a fracture, which muted 
the anti-colonial understanding of Jefferson’s text in line with 
Churchill’s wholehearted support for imperialism.14  
A. Upholding Liberal Democracy 
To understand Winston Churchill’s constitutional philosophy, 
we must first clear up the common misunderstanding that he saw 
democracy as a second-best solution.  The misunderstanding 
stems from his line to the House of Commons, which is often 
 
13 A Long and Hard War (Dec. 26, 1941), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 
1, at 6536, 6536; see Parliament Bill, supra note 9 (“Government of the people, by the 
people, for the people, still remains the sovereign definition of democracy.”); see 
generally GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE 
AMERICA (1992) (thoroughly analyzing the Gettysburg Address). One notable 
example of Churchill’s fight against privilege was his effort to end the absolute veto 
of the unelected House of Lords over legislation. See Parliament Bill (Feb. 22, 1911), 
in 2 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 1692, 1694–96, 1700; see also Gerard N. 
Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. L. REV. 303, 319–22 (2011) (providing 
some background on the debate that led to the Parliament Act of 1911). 
14 See, e.g., The Anglo-American Alliance (July 4, 1950), in 8 CHURCHILL 
SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 8031, 8032 (hailing “the Declaration of Independence, 
which has become a common creed on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean”); see also 
PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE 212 (1997) (discussing the decline in the revolutionary thrust of the 
Declaration over time). 
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quoted as “democracy is the worst form of government—except for 
all the others.”15  What he actually said was:  
[I]t has been said that democracy is the worst form of Govern-
ment except all those other forms that have been tried from 
time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that 
the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public 
opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, 
guide, and control the actions of Ministers who are their 
servants and not their masters.16  
In other words, Churchill rejected the jaded view that democracy 
was worthwhile due only to the absence of the flaws that plagued 
other political systems.17  He instead celebrated, albeit imperfect-
ly, liberal principles such as the right to vote, jury trial, freedom 
of speech, and religious freedom throughout his career.18  
 
15 See, e.g., Barack H. Obama, Remarks at Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultur-
al Center in Athens, Greece (Nov. 16, 2016); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Voting 
Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, 68 VAND. L. REV. 441, 447 (2015). 
16 Parliament Bill, supra note 9, at 7566. 
17 A more precise statement of Churchill’s belief in democracy’s strength was:  
“In a society where there is democratic tolerance and freedom under the 
law, many kinds of evils will crop up, but give them a little time and they 
usually breed their own cure.” I do not see any reason to doubt the truth of 
that.  
There is no country in the world where the process of self-criticism and 
self-correction is more active than in the United States. 
America and Britain, supra note 1, at 8560 (quoting his American mentor Represen-
tative Bourke Cockran); see id. at 8559–60 (“I am a great believer in democracy and 
free speech. Naturally when immense masses of people speak the same language 
and enjoy the fullest rights of free speech they often say some things that all the 
others do not agree to. If speech were always to be wise it could never be free, and 
even where it is most strictly regulated it is not always wise.”). 
18 See Prolongation of Parliament (Oct. 31, 1944), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, 
supra note 1, at 7020, 7023 (“At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy is 
the little man, walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross 
on a piece of paper—no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion can possibly 
diminish the overwhelming importance of that point.”); Capital Punishment (July 
15, 1948), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7686, 7696 (“We do not allow 
the decision of guilt or innocence to be decided in the first instance by trained legal 
minds or persons of exceptional education. The prime guarantee of British justice is 
the honest opinion of the ordinary man or woman.”); What Good’s a Constitution?, 
supra note 4, at 40 (“[T]he right of freedom of speech and publication is extended, 
under the [British] Constitution, to those who in theory seek to overthrow 
established institutions by force of arms so long as they do not commit any illegal 
act.”); Prayer Book Measure (June 14, 1928), in 5 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 
1, at 4441, 4442 (“To refuse to a religious community a wider latitude in spiritual 
matters is a very objectionable step for any modern Legislature to take. It appears to 
be contrary to the spirit of religious toleration which, I am quite sure, would rule the 
House of Commons in the case of any other faith or sect among the hundreds which 
exist side by side within the circuit of the British Empire.”). For thoughts on 
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In assessing constitutional legitimacy, Churchill took a 
pragmatic stance tempered by respect for tradition.19  To a Dutch 
audience in 1946, he gave his “conception of free democracy based 
upon the people’s will and expressing itself through representa-
tive assemblies under generally accepted constitutional forms.”20  
He named some  
simple, practical tests by which the virtue and reality of any 
political democracy may be measured.  Does the Government in 
any country rest upon a free, constitutional basis, assuring the 
people the right to vote according to their will, for whatever 
candidates they choose?21   
For example: “Is there the right of free expression of opinion, free 
support, free opposition, free advocacy and free criticism of the 
Government of the day?  Are there Courts of Justice free from 
interference by the Executive or from threats of mob violence, 
and free from all association with particular . . . parties?”22  “Will 
these courts,” he asked,  
administer public and well-established laws associated in the 
human mind with the broad principles of fair play and justice?  
Will there be fair play for the poor as well as for the rich?  Will 
there be fair play for private persons as well as for Government 
officials?  Will the rights of the individual, subject to his duties 
to the state, be maintained, asserted and exalted?23  
 
Churchill’s lukewarm support of women’s suffrage, see THEAKSTON, supra note 3, at 
101–12. 
19 For Churchill’s views on the value of tradition, see The Sinews of Peace (Mar. 
5, 1946), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7285, 7288 (“[C]ourts of justice, 
independent of the executive, unbiased by any party, should administer laws which 
have received the broad assent of large majorities or are consecrated by time and 
custom.”); “The Sandys Storm” (July 11, 1938), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, at 5992, 5995 (quoting Benjamin Disraeli’s maxim that “[n]ations are ruled 
by force or by tradition” and adding: “[t]here is no humiliation in bowing to tradi-
tion”); “A Sense of Crowd and Urgency” (Oct. 28, 1943), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, 
supra note 1, at 6869 (arguing that the bombed House of Commons chamber should 
be rebuilt in exactly the same form in part because “[l]ogic is a poor guide compared 
with custom”). 
20 The United States of Europe (May 9, 1946), in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, at 7318, 7321. 
21 Id. at 7321–22; see The Sinews of Peace, supra note 19 (“[T]he people of any 
country have the right, and should have the power by constitutional action, by free 
unfettered elections, with secret ballot, to choose or change the character or form of 
government under which they dwell.”). 
22 The United States of Europe, supra note 20, at 7322. 
23 Id. Churchill listed nearly the same tests in a 1936 magazine article that is 
discussed in Part II. See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 39. 
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Churchill’s invocation of fair play as a constitutional principle 
is worth dwelling on for a moment because that idea has largely 
dropped out of legal discourse.24  Unlike “the rule of law,” the 
ideal popularized by the British theorist A.V. Dicey that is now an 
important way of describing what liberal democracy epitomizes, 
“fair play” connotes a substantive standard that informs all govern-
ment actions, not just judicial decisions.25  When President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt delivered a speech on the 150th anniversary of 
the Constitutional Convention, he explained:  
The surest protection of the individual and of minorities is that 
fundamental tolerance and feeling for fair play which the Bill of 
Rights assumes.  But tolerance and fair play would disappear 
here as it has in some other lands if the great mass of people 
were denied confidence in their justice, their security and their 
self-respect.26 
The Supreme Court of the United States adopted fair play as a 
standard in its canonical personal jurisdictional decision—Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington—but that is the only way in 
which fair play still plays a self-conscious role in law.27 
Churchill’s next linchpin for constitutional democracy was an 
independent judiciary, which he called “the foundation of many 
things in our island life.”28  “The only subordination which a judge 
knows in his judicial capacity,” he stated, “is that which he owes 
to the existing body of legal doctrine enunciated in years past by 
his brethren on the bench, past and present, and upon the laws 
passed by Parliament which have received the Royal Assent.”29   
 
 
24 See, e.g., Justin Tosi, A Fair Play Account of Legitimate Political Authority, 23 
LEGAL THEORY 55 (2017). 
25 See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION 179–91 (7th ed. 1908).  
26 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937), in 
1937 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 359, 366 
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941). 
27 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (referring to “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice”). 
28 Judges’ Remuneration Bill (Mar. 23, 1954), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, at 8544, 8547 (arguing for a pay increase for judges). 
29 Id. (“The relations between the Judiciary and the Legislature are also 
exceptional and privileged. Parliament has deliberately maintained the judges in a 
special position, not only by charging their salaries to the Consolidated Fund so that 
they do not fall within the annual scrutiny of Parliament, but also by eschewing any 
claim to criticise a judge’s conduct in his judicial capacity except on a special Motion 
for an Address to the Crown for the judge’s removal.”). 
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As a result,  
[t]he service rendered by judges demands the highest qualities 
of learning, training and character. . . .  A form of life and con-
duct far more severe and restricted than that of ordinary people 
is required from judges and, though unwritten, has been most 
strictly observed.  They are at once privileged and restricted.30 
He once wrote, 
Our judges extend impartially to all men protection, not only 
against wrongs committed by private persons, but also against 
the arbitrary acts of public authority.  The independence of the 
courts is, to all of us, the guarantee of freedom and the equal 
rule of law. 
It must, therefore, be the first concern of . . . a free country 
to preserve and maintain the independence of the courts of 
justice, however inconvenient that independence may be, on 
occasion, to the government . . . .31  
If an emergency required limits on judicial authority through 
a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Churchill held that 
only a nation’s legislature could authorize such a constitutional 
departure.32  In an address to the American Bar Association in 
1957, he said:  
National governments may indeed obtain sweeping emergency 
powers for the sake of protecting the community in times of war 
or other perils.  These will temporarily curtail or suspend the 
freedom of ordinary men and women, but special powers must 
be granted by the elected representatives of those same people 
by Congress or by Parliament, as the case may be.33  
Such powers “do not belong to the State or Government as a 
right.  Their exercise needs vigilant scrutiny, and their grant may 
 
30 Id. at 8548. 
31 What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 39. 
32 See Liberty and the Law (July 31, 1957), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, at 8682–83. 
33 See id; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”); Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.) (“An 
Act for the better secureing the Liberty of the Subject and for Prevention of 
Imprisonments beyond the Seas.”); cf. The King’s Dominions (Apr. 20, 1939), in 6 
CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 6105, 6107 (“In the British Empire we not 
only look out across the seas towards each other, but backwards to our own history, 
to Magna Charta, to Habeas Corpus, to the Petition of Right, to Trial by Jury, to the 
English Common Law and to Parliamentary Democracy. These are the milestones 
and monuments that mark the path along which the British race has marched to 
leadership and freedom.”). 
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be swiftly withdrawn.”34  On the day that Britain declared war 
against Nazi Germany, Churchill said:  
Perhaps it might seem a paradox that a war undertaken in the 
name of liberty and right should require, as a necessary part of 
its processes, the surrender for the time being of so many of the 
dearly valued liberties and rights. . . .  We are sure that these 
liberties will be in hands which will not abuse them, which will 
use them for no class or party interests, which will cherish and 
guard them, and we look forward to the day . . . when our 
liberties and rights will be restored to us, and when we shall be 
able to share them with the peoples to whom such blessings are 
unknown.35  
Indeed, a recent study shows that Churchill exercised more re-
straint in the use of detention without charge during World War 
II than FDR did for his Administration’s broad internment of 
Japanese Americans.36 
B. Invoking the Constitution of the Great Republic 
When expressing his constitutional ideas, Churchill was fond 
of drawing connections with our Constitution.37  He was well-
versed in the subject, as he showed in a chapter entitled “The 
American Constitution” in one of his final books.38  The ex-Prime 
Minister described the backdrop of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the views of some of its leading members, and summarized 
the proposal itself before noting:  
[A] written constitution carries with it the danger of a cramping 
rigidity.  What body of men, however far-sighted, can lay down 
precepts in advance for settling the problems of future genera-
 
34 Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8683; see 5 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 5 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 679 (1951) (quoting a cable that Churchill sent to the 
Home Secretary stating that the suspension of habeas corpus “must be interpreted 
with the utmost vigilance by a Free Parliament”); id. at 680 (quoting another cable 
in which Churchill said that suspension was “contrary to the whole spirit of British 
public life and British history”). 
35 War (Sept. 3, 1939), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 6152, 6153.  
36 See Amanda L. Tyler, Courts and the Executive in Wartime: A Comparative 
Study of the American and British Approaches to the Internment of Citizens During 
World War II and Their Lessons for Today, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 796 (2019); see 
also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding aspects of the 
President’s Executive Order on the detention of Japanese-Americans). 
37 See, e.g., Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8682 (“It has often been 
pointed out that the 5th and 14th Amendments of the American Constitution are an 
echo of the Magna Carta.”). 
38 See AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 252–66; cf. What Good’s a 
Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40 (quoting the Convention debates). 
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tions?  The delegates at Philadelphia were well aware of this.  
They made provision for amendment, and the document drawn 
up by them was adaptable enough in practice to permit changes 
in the Constitution.  But it had to be proved in argument and 
debate and generally accepted throughout the land that any 
changes proposed would follow the guiding ideas of the 
Founding Fathers.  A prime object of the Constitution was to be 
conservative; it was to guard the principles and machinery of 
[the] State from capricious and ill-considered alteration.  In its 
fundamental doctrine the American people acquired an institu-
tion which was to command the same respect and loyalty as in 
England are given to Parliament and Crown.39 
Churchill went on to describe the ratification debates in detail.40  
He paid special attention to Madison’s Federalist No. 10, which 
was quoted at length for its description of factions.41  “The 
Federalist letters,” Churchill wrote, “are among the classics of 
American literature.  Their practical wisdom stands pre-eminent 
amid the stream of controversial writing at the time.”42 
While acknowledging the political skills of the Framers, 
Churchill held that the Constitution was largely a restatement of 
British common sense.  “At first sight,” he wrote, “this authori-
tative document presents a sharp contrast with the store of 
traditions and precedents that make up the unwritten Constitu-
tion of Britain.  Yet behind it lay no revolutionary theory.”43  The 
text was instead based on  
Old English doctrine, freshly formulated to meet an urgent 
American need.  The Constitution was a reaffirmation of faith 
in the principles painfully evolved over the centuries by the 
English-speaking peoples.  It enshrined long-standing English 
ideas of justice and liberty, henceforth to be regarded on the 
other side of the Atlantic as basically American.44  
Churchill’s view that the Constitution enshrined British 
thinking was a staple of his later speeches.45  In a 1950 campaign 
address, he said:  
 
39 AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 252–57. 
40 Id. at 257–60. 
41 See id. at 258–59. 
42 Id. at 258. 
43 Id. at 256. 
44 Id. 
45 The Crown and Parliament (May 27, 1953), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, at 8485, 8486. 
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The wisdom of our forebears for more than 300 years has sought 
the division of power in the Constitution. . . .  The great men 
who founded the American Constitution expressed this same 
separation of authority in the strongest and most durable form.  
Not only did they divide executive, legislative, and judicial func-
tions, but also by instituting a federal system they preserved 
immense and sovereign rights to local communities and by all 
these means they have maintained—often at some inconven-
ience—a system of law and liberty under which they have 
thrived.46 
Three years later, he claimed that “no Constitution was ever 
written in better English” than America’s Constitution.47  “The 
key thought alike of the British constitutional monarchy and the 
republic of the United States,” he stated, “is the hatred of dicta-
torship.  Both here and across the ocean, over the generations 
and the centuries the idea of the division of power has lain at the 
root of our development.  We do not want to live under a system 
dominated either by one man or one theme.”48 
While there is some truth in Churchill’s view of Anglo-
American constitutional unity, there was a political motive that 
probably led him to exaggerate those connections.49  Perhaps the 
strongest of his many strong opinions was that a close partner-
ship between the United States and Britain was essential for 
world peace.50  Churchill expressed this idea when Hitler was the 
 
46 Woodford Adoption Meeting (Jan. 28, 1950), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, at 7907, 7912; see “A Hush over Europe” (Aug. 8, 1939), in 6 CHURCHILL 
SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 6149, 6151 (“The architects of the American Constitution 
were as careful as those who shaped the British Constitution to guard against the[ir] 
whole life and fortunes, and all the laws and freedom of the nation, being placed in 
the hands of a tyrant. Checks and counter-checks in the body politic, large 
devolutions of State government, instruments and processes of free debate, frequent 
recurrence to first principles, the right of opposition to the most powerful govern-
ments, and above all ceaseless vigilance, have preserved, and will preserve, the 
broad characteristics of British and American institutions.”). 
47 The Crown and Parliament, supra note 45. 
48 Id. 
49 Churchill was aware that there were differences between the two Consti-
tutions. See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 2 THE WORLD CRISIS 693 (Free Press 2005) 
(1939) (stating that only the United States Constitution “secures to its supreme 
executive officer, at once the Sovereign and the Party Leader, such direct personal 
authority”); Constitutions of Britain and the United States, supra note 8 (noting “the 
profound differences between the Constitutions under which the two English-
speaking democracies have come to dwell”). 
50 See, e.g., Winston S. Churchill, The Union of the English-Speaking Peoples, 
NEWS OF THE WORLD, May 15, 1938, reprinted in THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra note 
5, at 310–18; Anglo-American Unity, in 7 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 
6823, 6823–27. 
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enemy and repeated that view when Stalin was the danger.51  In 
his renowned “Iron Curtain” speech that anticipated the Cold 
War, he gave  
the crux of what I have travelled here to say.  Neither the sure 
prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation 
will be gained without what I have called the fraternal as-
sociation of the English-speaking peoples.  This means a special 
relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire 
and the United States.52  
One way to foster that special relationship was by highlighting 
the commonalities between British and American law. 
C. Reimagining the Declaration of Independence 
The best example of Churchill’s creativity in reading our basic 
texts involved the Declaration of Independence.53  In Pauline 
Maier’s splendid account of the Declaration’s history, she ob-
served that by World War II Jefferson’s manifesto for revolution 
against the Crown was viewed as “a part of the British inheri-
tance as it is of ours.”54  “[J]ust imagine George III’s amazement,” 
she wrote, “at learning that the Declaration of Independence 
would one day become a constructive part of the British 
heritage!”55  The wartime alliance helps explain the evolution in 
 
51 See The Atlantic Charter (Aug. 24, 1941), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra 
note 1, at 6472, 6473 (trumpeting his first meeting with President Roosevelt as 
symbolizing “something even more majestic—namely; the marshalling of the good 
forces of the world against the evil forces which are now so formidable”); see also 
Address to the United States Congress (Jan. 17, 1952), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, 
supra note 1, at 8323, 8329 (“[O]ne thing which is exactly the same as when I was 
here last. Britain and the United States are working together and working for the 
same high cause. . . . Let us make sure that the supreme fact of the twentieth 
century is that they tread the same path.”). 
52 See The Sinews of Peace, supra note 19, at 7289; see also id. at 7290 (“From 
Stettin to the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across 
the Continent.”). 
53 See Election Address (Oct. 15, 1951), in 8 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, 
at 8265, 8268 (“ ‘All men are created equal,’ says the American Declaration of 
Independence. ‘All men shall be kept equal,’ say the British Socialist Party.”); The 
Twentieth Century—Its Promise and Its Realization (Mar. 31, 1949), in 7 
CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7801, 7803 (quoting the “famous American 
maxim ‘Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed’ ”); 
What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 39 (“[T]he founders of the American 
Republic in their Declaration of Independence inculcate as a duty binding upon all 
worthy sons of America ‘a frequent recurrence to first principles.’ ”). 
54 See MAIER, supra note 14 (quoting Archibald MacLeish, who was the 
Librarian of Congress during World War II). 
55 Id. at 213. 
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the Declaration’s meaning, but Churchill was the most promi-
nent public figure to make the argument that the Declaration 
should be understood as an Anglo-American authority on a par 
with the Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights.56  In so 
doing, he advanced the special relationship and blunted the 
Declaration’s message of anti-colonialism at a time when the 
British Empire was still robust.57 
On the Fourth of July in 1918, Churchill gave his first 
speech on the Declaration of Independence in support of a resolu-
tion providing, in part, that the British people “rejoice that the 
love of liberty and justice on which the American nation was 
founded should in the present time of trial have united the whole 
English-speaking family in a brotherhood of arms.”58  “A great 
harmony exists,” he said,  
between the spirit and language of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and all we are fighting for now.  A similar harmony 
exists between the principles of that Declaration and all that 
the British people have wished to stand for, and have in fact 
achieved at last both here at home and in the self-governing 
Dominions of the Crown.59 
“The Declaration of Independence is not only an American docu-
ment,” Churchill explained.60  
It follows on the Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights as the 
third great title-deed on which the liberties of the English-
speaking people are founded. . . .  They spring from the same 
source; they come from the same well of practical truth, and 
that well is here by the banks of the Thames, in this island 
which is the birthplace and origin of the British and American 
race.61 
He closed by repurposing the Declaration’s pledge of “our lives, 
our fortunes, and our sacred honour” as a mantra for the Allied 
effort in World War I.62 
 
56 See, e.g., Third Great Title-Deed, supra note 10, at 2613–16; see also The Bill 
of Rights 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.). 
57 Cf. A New Experience—Victory (Nov. 10, 1942), in 6 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, 
supra note 1, at 6692, 6695 (“I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to 
preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”). 
58 Third Great Title-Deed, supra note 10, at 2613. 
59 Id. at 2614. 
60 Id.; see AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 189 (“The Declaration was in the 
main a restatement of the principles which had animated the Whig struggle against 
the later Stuarts and the English Revolution of 1688 . . . .”). 
61 Third Great Title-Deed, supra note 10.  
62 Id. at 2616. 
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Into the 1950s, Churchill continued to invoke the Declara-
tion of Independence to support Anglo-American cooperation.63  
The Iron Curtain address made the point this way:  
[W]e must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great 
principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint 
inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through 
Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus [Act of 
1679], trial by jury, and the English common law find their 
most famous expression in the American Declaration of 
Independence.64 
A year later in Life magazine, Churchill repeated his call for a 
special relationship between Britain and the United States and 
defended the anticommunist Truman Doctrine by asking Ameri-
cans “to march forward unswervingly upon the path to which 
[d]estiny has called them, guided by the principles of the Decla-
ration of Independence, expressed so carefully and so pregnantly 
in the balanced, well-shaped language of the 18th century, by the 
founders of the greatest State in the world.”65  And in 1950, he 
gave an Independence Day address and stated that both nations  
must forever be on our guard, and always vigilant against 
[tyranny]—in all this we march together.  Not only, if need be, 
under the fire of the enemy but also in those realms of thought 
which are consecrated to the rights and the dignity of man, and 
which are so amazingly laid down in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, which has become a common creed on both sides of 
the Atlantic Ocean.66 
Notably absent from Churchill’s reading of the Declaration 
as a common law text was any mention of its revolutionary 
themes.67  On one level this makes sense because he was trying to 
downplay the divisions between Britain and America.  On another 
level, though, Churchill’s zeal for Britain’s empire could not be 
reconciled with Jefferson’s statement of national self-determina-
 
63 See The Anglo-American Alliance, supra note 14. 
64 The Sinews of Peace, supra note 19. 
65 Winston S. Churchill, If I Were an American, LIFE MAG., Apr. 14, 1947, 
reprinted in THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 390; see DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 
TRUMAN 547–49 (1992) (describing President Truman’s pledge to support pro-
Western governments in Greece and Turkey against Soviet aggression after Britain 
no longer could).  
66 See The Anglo-American Alliance, supra note 14. 
67 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2. (U.S. 1776) (“[W]henever 
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the 
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government . . . .”). 
2020] CHURCHILL ON THE CONSTITUTION 729 
tion.  In his 1918 speech, he acknowledged that in the Declara-
tion of Independence “we lost an [e]mpire, but by it we also 
preserved an [e]mpire.  By applying its principles and learning 
its lesson we have maintained our communion with the powerful 
Commonwealths our children have established beyond the 
seas.”68  Some of Great Britain’s former colonies would probably 
beg to differ with this rosy description.  In any event, by weaving 
the Declaration of Independence into the common law, Churchill 
sought to tame this radical authority and gave the text an 
evolving rather than a fixed construction.69 
II.  DIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
This Part explores Churchill’s unorthodox explanation for 
judicial review in the United States and for its absence in Great 
Britain.  While he admired the flexibility of the uncodified British 
Constitution, during the New Deal he reached the conclusion 
that judicial review of our “fixed” Constitution was essential 
because of America’s diversity.70  Churchill’s diversity hypothesis 
contradicts Madison’s reasoning in Federalist No. 10 and is a 
testable hypothesis for future research about how judicial review 
is practiced across the world and in the fifty states.71 
A. Flexible vs. Fixed 
Until the 1930s, Churchill criticized written constitutions as 
too rigid.72  In a 1908 speech, he stated: “No country in the world 
has such a flexible Constitution as ours.  The Constitutions of 
France, Germany, and the United States are far more rigid, far 
 
68 See Third Great Title-Deed, supra note 10. 
69 See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 1 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: 
THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 225 (1956) (“This slow but continuous growth of what is 
popularly known as ‘case law’ ultimately achieved much the same freedoms and 
rights for the individual as are enshrined in other countries by written instruments 
such as the Declarations of the Rights of Man and the spacious and splendid 
provisions of the American Declaration of Independence and constitutional guaran-
tees of civil rights.”). 
70 See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40; see also Liberty and the 
Law, supra note 32, at 8683 (making the same point). 
71 See infra text accompanying notes 101–103. 
72 See Prohibition, supra note 8 (criticizing the “rat-trap rigidity of the American 
Constitution”); supra text accompanying note 39. In this respect, Churchill was 
following in a tradition in British commentary on the United States Constitution. 
See WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 30 (photo. reprt. 2007) (1873) 
(stating that under the American Constitution “[t]here is no elastic element, 
everything is rigid, specified, dated.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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more fortified against popular movements than the Constitution 
under whose gradual evolution this peaceful, law-abiding country 
has dwelt secure for so many centuries.”73  Two decades later, he 
said:  
I am not one of those who either hope much or apprehend much 
from the attempt to develop constitutional arrangements for the 
British Empire of a rigid character.  The whole advantage of our 
position has been that we have been able to get on without 
writing things down on paper.  The British Empire could not 
have been built up by anything that could be written on parch-
ment.74 
And in a book on World War I first published in 1927, Churchill 
wrote:  
The rigid Constitution of the United States, the gigantic scale 
and strength of its party machinery, the fixed terms for which 
public officers and representatives are chosen, invest the 
President with a greater measure of autocratic power than was 
possessed before the war by the Head of any great [s]tate.75  
What did Churchill mean when he called our Constitution 
rigid?  In part, he was referring to the fixed terms of elected 
officials, which stood in contrast to Parliament’s freedom to set 
the length of its own term.76  He also noted the supermajority 
requirement to ratify an Article V amendment.77  But Churchill 
also believed that judicial review made a constitution fixed.  Not 
long after the Supreme Court issued A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States78 in 1935, he wrote an op-ed on “The 
Constitutions of Great Britain and the United States.”79  In the 
op-ed, he told British readers that “the Supreme Court has given 
a unanimous judgment which stultifies and largely paralyzes the 
whole vast policy of social and economic change embodied in 
 
73 Election Address (Apr. 14, 1908), in 1 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 
943, 953. 
74 The Empire (Oct. 18, 1926), in 4 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 4103, 
4104. 
75 THE WORLD CRISIS, supra note 49, at 679. 
76 The current law on that question is the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 
14, § 1 (UK), which can, of course, be changed by Parliament.  
77 See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40 (noting that consti-
tutional amendments were ratified “after prodigious struggles, on only a score of 
occasions during the whole history of the United States”). 
78 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
79 Constitutions of Britain and the United States, supra note 8. 
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President Roosevelt’s National [Industrial] Recovery Act.”80  This 
was possible because  
[in the United States] a written Constitution [is] enforced by a 
Supreme Court according to the letter of the law, under which 
anyone may bring a test case challenging not merely the 
interpretation of a law, but the law itself, and if the Court 
decides for the appellant, be he only an owner of a few chickens, 
the whole action of the Legislature and the Executive becomes 
to that extent null and void.81 
“It is very difficult,” Churchill wrote,  
[f]or us . . . to realize the kind of deadlock which has been 
reached in the United States. . . .  Imagine—to take an instance 
nearer home—some gigantic measure of insurance as big as our 
widows’ pensions, health and employment insurance rolled 
together, which had deeply interwoven itself in the whole life of 
the people, upon which every kind of contract and business 
arrangement had been based, being declared to have no validity 
by a court of law.82 
The Depression and the New Deal clarified Churchill’s 
thinking on the purpose and enforcement of constitutional law.  
Although he worked closely with President Roosevelt during 
World War II, Churchill was a fairly detached observer of FDR 
prior to becoming Prime Minister in 1940.83  For example, in a 
1934 article, he praised the “renaissance of creative effort with 
which the name of Roosevelt will always be associated” but added 
that “[a]lthough the dictatorship is veiled by constitutional forms, 
it is none the less effective.”84  Two years later, he made the 
following bold prediction about the looming clash between FDR 
and the Supreme Court: 
[A]fter all the complaints against the rigidity of the United 
States Constitution and the threats of a presidential election on 
this issue, none of the suggested constitutional amendments has 
so far been adopted by the Administration.  This may explain 
why the “Nine Old Men” of the Supreme Court have not been 
more seriously challenged.  But the challenge may come at a 
later date, though it would perhaps be wiser to dissociate it 
 
80 Id. 
81 See What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40. 
82 Id. 
83 See Winston Churchill, While the World Watches, COLLIER’S, Dec. 29, 1934, at 
24, 24. 
84 Id. 
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from any question of the age of the judges, lest it be the liberal 
element in the court which is weakened.85 
FDR blundered and did exactly what Churchill warned against.  
By making his “Court-packing” plan contingent on age (a new 
Justice would be added for each current one over the age of 
seventy), Roosevelt undercut support within the Court and 
among many potential allies in Congress.86   
B. What Good’s a Constitution? 
Churchill’s deepest reflection on constitutionalism came in a 
Collier’s magazine article published in August 1936.87  He opened 
that piece with a fiery denunciation of socialism in Nazi Germa-
ny and in the Soviet Union.88  But Churchill said that the United 
States also suffered from “an extension of the activities of the 
Executive . . . .  There have been efforts to exalt the power of the 
central government and to limit the rights of individuals.”89  He 
explained the basic question presented by these developments  
is whether a fixed constitution is a bulwark or a fetter.  From 
what I have written it is plain that I incline to the side of those 
who would regard it as a bulwark, and that I rank the citizen 
higher than the State, and regard the State as useful only in so 
far as it preserves his inherent rights.90  
 
85 What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40. Churchill was presumably 
talking about Justice Louis Brandeis, who was eighty years old when the Court-
packing plan was introduced. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 
714–15 (2009). Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who was seventy-five when the 
Court packing plan was being debated in 1937, also sided with the Administration in 
some of the most divisive cases. See JAMES F. SIMON, FDR AND CHIEF JUSTICE 
HUGHES: THE PRESIDENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE EPIC BATTLE OVER THE 
NEW DEAL 11 (2012) (stating that Hughes was born in 1862); see also R.R. Ret. Bd. v. 
Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374–92 (1935) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the 
Court’s invalidation of the Railroad Retirement Act); Perry v. United States, 294 
U.S. 330 (1935) (upholding, in an opinion by the Chief Justice, President Roosevelt’s 
controversial devaluation of Treasury bonds).  
86 See, e.g., JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE 
SUPREME COURT 338–39 (2010); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS 187–90 (Octagon 
Books 1979) (1941). 
87 See What Good’s A Constitution?, supra note 4, at 22.  
88 See id. (“In Germany, for instance, the alliance between national patriotism, 
tradition and pride on the one hand, and discontent about the inequalities of wealth 
on the other, made the Weimar Constitution ‘a scrap of paper.’ ”); id. at 39 (“Much 
the same thing has happened in Russia. The powerful aid of national sentiment and 
imperialist aspirations has been invoked to buttress a decaying Communism.”).  
89 Id. at 39. 
90 Id. 
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Churchill’s praise for a fixed constitution, which marked a change 
from his prior views, may have been motivated by the spread of 
totalitarianism.  But why did Britain not also need a codified con-
stitution to preserve liberty? 
Churchill’s answer was that America’s diversity required a 
fixed constitution.  “When one considers the immense size of the 
United States,” he explained,  
and the extraordinary contrasts of climate and character which 
differentiate the forty-eight sovereign states of the American 
Union, as well as the inevitable conflict of interests between 
North and South and between East and West, it would seem 
that the participants of so vast a federation have the right to 
effectual guarantees upon the fundamental laws, and that these 
should not be easily changed to suit a particular emergency or 
fraction of the country.91 
Quoting James Wilson at the Constitutional Convention, he said 
that “[t]he founders of the Union, although its corpus was then so 
much smaller, realized this with profound conviction.  They did 
not think it possible to entrust legislation for so diverse a com-
munity and enormous an area to a simple majority.”92  “The so-
called ‘rigidity’ of the American Constitution,” Churchill 
reasoned, “is in fact the guarantee of freedom to its . . . 
component parts.”93  Moreover, “[i]t may well be that this very 
quality of rigidity, which is today thought to be so galling, has 
been a prime factor in founding the greatness of the United 
States.”94  To frame a “constitution for a ‘United States of Europe’ 
for which so many thinkers on this side of the ocean aspire, fixed 
 
91 Id. at 40. 
92 Id. (“ ‘To control the powers and conduct of the legislature,’ said a leading 
member of the Convention of 1787, ‘by an overruling constitution was an 
improvement in the science and practice of government reserved to the American 
States.’ ”); see also 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 361 (Merill Jenson ed., 1976) (providing the original Wilson 
quotation). 
93 What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40; see id. (“That a set of 
persons, however eminent, carried into office upon some populist heave should have 
the power to make the will of a bare majority effective over the whole of the United 
States might cause disasters upon the greatest scale from which recovery would not 
be swift or easy.”). 
94 Id; see id. (“ ‘Taking the rigidity out of the American Constitution’ means, and 
is intended to mean, new gigantic accessions of power to the dominating centre of 
government and giving it the means to make new fundamental laws enforceable 
upon all American citizens.”). 
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and almost unalterable guarantees would be required by the 
acceding nations.”95  
By contrast, Churchill cast Britain as a homogeneous nation 
that did not need judicial review.96  In his 1957 speech to the 
ABA, he spelled this idea out more clearly: “I speak, of course, as 
a layman on legal topics, but I believe that our differences are 
more apparent than real, and are the result of geographical and 
other physical conditions rather than any true division of 
principle.”97  “The Supreme Court survived and flourished in the 
United States,” Churchill explained,  “England was too compact 
and too uniform a community to have need of it.  But the Su-
preme Court in America has often been the guardian and 
upholder of American liberty.  Long may it continue to thrive.”98  
To return to his 1936 essay, Churchill conceded that the “free” 
and “flexible” British Constitution could not be applied to the 
diverse lands that were self-governing dominions or outright 
colonies in the Empire.99  But “[i]n this small island of Britain we 
make laws for ourselves,” by which he meant that an omnipotent 
Parliament did not threaten freedom there.100 
There are discordant echoes of Federalist No. 10 in Chur-
chill’s thinking.  Madison contended that smaller and more uni-
form communities would be more likely to oppress people.101  
 
95 Id. 
96 Cf. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 125–26 (“England has long described itself as 
a homogeneous country in which discrimination was a problem that could be 
adequately handled through ordinary political processes.”). Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales probably never saw Britain as Churchill did, and England is 
certainly not homogeneous today. See id. at 128 (expressing doubt in the 1990s that 
England was a monoculture). This probably means that judicial review is now 
necessary in Britain. The United Kingdom Supreme Court’s opinion invalidating the 
lengthy prorogation of Parliament over Brexit is a step in that direction. See R v. 
Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41, [70] (appeal taken from Eng. & Scot.) 
97 Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8683. Chief Justice Warren attended 
Churchill’s speech. See The Law Society’s Dinner at Guildhall in London, July 31, 43 
A.B.A. J. 911, 911–12 (1957) [hereinafter The Law Society’s Dinner]. 
98 Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8683. In the official collection of 
Churchill’s speeches, he is quoted in the ABA address: “Forty-nine states, each with 
fundamental rights and a different situation, is a different proposition [for judicial 
review].” Id. The ABA Journal quotes the line, though, as “[f]orty-eight states . . . .” 
The Law Society’s Dinner, supra note 97, at 914. I do not know which is correct 
rendition of Churchill’s remarks, though the basic point is the same. 
99 What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40. 
100 Id. See also Liberty and the Law, supra note 32, at 8683 (stating that parlia-
mentary sovereignty was “all very well in an island which has not been invaded for 
nearly 2,000 years.”). 
101 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 11, at 63–64 (“The smaller the 
society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the 
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Larger, more diverse states would be less likely to produce 
tyranny because the diverse elements would be hard-pressed to 
assemble a majority coalition.102  Churchill said the opposite.  He 
thought that diversity made majority abuses more likely and 
thus judicial review, which Madison did not discuss in The 
Federalist, more essential.103  Madison did recognize that consti-
tutional structures were important to impede a national fac-
tion,104 so one could say that Churchill was just buttressing that 
principle with judicial review.  But the British Constitution 
contains few structural impediments to majority rule, as most of 
the relevant powers are concentrated in the House of Commons.  
Still, Churchill did not consider this a significant problem 
because Britain was small and compact.105   
While Churchill gave judicial review its due for larger and 
more diverse societies, he closed his article on a cautionary note 
that was almost certainly a critical comment about some of the 
Court’s decisions striking down aspects of the New Deal.  “The 
rigidity of the Constitution of the United States,” he wrote,  
is the shield of the common man.  But that rigidity ought not to 
be interpreted by pedants.  In England we continually give new 
interpretation to the archaic language of our fundamental insti-
tutions, and this is no new thing in the United States.  The judi-
 
fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found 
of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, 
and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they 
concert and execute their plans of oppression.”). 
102 See id. at 64 (“Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties 
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a 
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive 
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and 
to act in unison with each other.”). 
103 What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40. Consider an analogy to en 
banc review in federal circuit courts. A circuit that is relatively homogeneous with a 
small number of judges does not need to resort to en banc review because a given 
panel of that court will probably not disagree sharply with a different panel. As a 
circuit grows more diverse with more judges, the need for en banc review is greater 
because the possibility that one panel will be an outlier is greater. En banc review 
can be understood as judicial review of a panel decision in this context. 
104 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 11, at 349–51 (James Madison). 
105 On the other hand, after the Labor Party won the 1945 election and 
embarked on a sweeping program of nationalization, Churchill did grumble about 
the need to limit “single-chamber” democracy. Election Address (Feb. 4, 1950), in 8 
CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 7914, 7915 (“There is another element of 
instability in our British life which does not exist in most of the other free countries 
of the world. There is no written constitution.”). What he meant, though, was that 
the Conservative Party should be returned to power. See id. (“I rest my hopes on a 
new Parliament.”). 
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ciary have obligations which go beyond expounding the mere 
letter of the law.  The Constitution must be made to work.106 
“So august a body as the Supreme Court in dealing with law,” he 
concluded, “must also deal with the life of the United States, and 
words, however solemn, are only true when they preserve their 
vital relationship to facts.”107 
Was Churchill right to connect diversity with judicial re-
view? The answer is unclear and calls for empirical study.  Such 
an inquiry will be difficult, though, if the comparisons are made 
between different nations.  For instance, how should diversity be 
measured among democracies?  Can common-law and civil-law 
systems be compared in a sensible way?  What other variables 
may explain the frequency of judicial review?  This Article cannot 
answer all of these questions.  Nevertheless, two examples pro-
vide modest support for Churchill’s claim.  One of the most—if 
not the most—diverse democracies in the world is India.  
Consistent with what may be labelled Churchill’s “diversity 
hypothesis,” the Indian Supreme Court is widely seen as one of 
the most aggressive in exercising judicial review.108  Meanwhile, 
one of the least—if not the least—diverse democracies in the 
world is Japan.  And the Japanese Supreme Court is widely seen 
as one of the most reluctant to use judicial review, as the 
diversity hypothesis would suggest.109  These two data points, 
though, are insufficient to establish a correlation between 
diversity and judicial review. 
Another empirical study might look at how judicial review 
differs among the fifty states.  State constitutional law is an 
understudied field.110  While there is at least one thoughtful anal-
ysis of how state courts interpret statutes,111 no corresponding 
article exists on how state courts undertake constitutional review 
 
106 What Good’s a Constitution?, supra note 4, at 40. 
107 Id. 
108 See Madhav Khosla, Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme 
Court: Towards an Evolved Debate, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 55, 95–96 
(2009). 
109 See David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2011) (exploring why the Japanese Supreme Court uses judicial 
review so rarely).  
110 See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–6 (2018) (making this point and seeking to 
rectify that deficit). 
111 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 
(2010). 
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under state constitutions.112  Nevertheless, because the legal cul-
ture among the states is more similar than the legal culture 
across national boundaries, one obstacle to a successful exami-
nation of the diversity hypothesis would be reduced.  Likewise, 
claims about the relative diversity in each state, or at least the 
ones being compared, may be simpler than assessing relative 
diversity across nations.  Again, though, this Article does not 
undertake such an interstate comparison. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Churchill’s diversity 
hypothesis is correct, what are the consequences for judicial 
review?  In a 2019 dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan argued that 
“it is hard to overstate the value, in a country like ours, of 
stability in the law.”113  What the Justice meant by “a country 
like ours” is not clear, but one possible reading is that the United 
States is a more diverse country now than when Churchill was 
writing in the 1930s.  Perhaps then, in an increasingly diverse 
society the fixed quality of its constitution becomes more 
critical.114  This could be true for several reasons.  First, using 
unwritten conventions as a substitute for fixed constitutional 
guarantees is less plausible since more diverse states lack the 
common culture necessary to agree on norms.115  Second, diverse 
societies may disagree more often or more deeply about what 
nebulous constitutional provisions mean.116  Third, a wider range 
 
112 A complicating factor is that some state constitutions are easy to amend 
through ballot propositions and others are not easy to amend. Judicial review in 
practice might differ significantly between these two types of states. Some states 
also rely more heavily on elected judges than others, which may account for some 
distinctions.  
113 Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
114 One objection to this argument is that British courts traditionally applied 
stare decisis strictly, as Churchill himself noted. See Liberty and the Law, supra note 
32, at 8683 (stating that his island had “a small legal profession, tightly bound by 
precedent”); W. Barton Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of 
Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797, 797–98 (1967) (stating that from 
1898 to 1966 the House of Lords maintained that they could overrule their own 
precedents). Stare decisis in this context, though, was dictated by parliamentary 
sovereignty rather than by a principle that the British Constitution should be fixed. 
Another way of putting this is that British courts were always applying the strong 
presumption of stare decisis that American courts use only for statutory cases. See, 
e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015) (stating that “stare decisis 
carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute”). 
115 For a fine discussion of constitutional norms, see Keith E. Whittington, The 
Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1847.  
116 With respect to Article Five amendments, one might expect that a more 
diverse society would have a harder time achieving the supermajority necessary for 
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of opinion or interests in a state may increase the chances that, 
without a constitutional barrier, a majority will enact policies 
that are unintentionally harmful to a minority.117  Fourth, the 
presence of more “discrete and insular minorities” may create 
tensions that raise the risk of discrimination in the absence of 
fixed constitutional restrictions.118  
But if our growing diversity means that the Constitution 
should become more rigid, there is more than one way of 
achieving that end.  One is interpretation according to original 
public meaning.119  If the meaning of the text is generally settled 
by its understanding at the time of ratification, then greater 
stability can result if courts apply that meaning consistently.120  
On the other hand, a faithful application of original public 
meaning means that contrary precedents or practices must 
sometimes be overruled if they were based on other interpretive 
premises.121  In effect, originalism holds out the promise of long-
run certainty at the expense of disruption in the here and now.  
Another way of making the Constitution more rigid is through a 
strict adherence to stare decisis.  Indeed, Justice Kagan was 
referring to stare decisis in her statement that a country like ours 
needs stability in the law.122  Judges must adapt precedents to 
new facts, but a strong presumption that precedent will be 
followed fosters certainty if courts apply the common-law method 
in good faith.  Trust in that good faith, however, might be eroded 
by diversity, as the common-law method is itself largely a distil-
 
ratification. Thus, in this sense the Constitution does tend to become more rigid as 
diversity grows. An argument can be made that diverse states should not let 
constitutional amendments be ratified by a single ballot proposition that requires 
only majority support, in the way that states like California permit. 
117 In other words, a majority may be unaware that a particular action is 
injurious to a viewpoint that is very different from and not represented in the ruling 
coalition. 
118 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This 
kind of wrongful discrimination could be undertaken with the goal of assimilation. 
119 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact 
in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4–5, 7 (2015). 
120 For a recent discussion of how the application of original public meaning can 
nonetheless change over time, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & 
CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
(2019).  
121 Another concern is that the original public meaning of a constitutional 
provision can be open-ended (for instance, “due process of law”) or ambiguous, such 
that it does little to fix legal concepts in a meaningful sense. That said, originalism 
does provide greater certainty in some circumstances than a common-law approach.  
122 See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2190 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
2020] CHURCHILL ON THE CONSTITUTION 739 
lation of unwritten norms.  Thus, the implications of the diversity 
hypothesis for the practice of judicial review are uncertain. 
In sum, Churchill’s comparative analysis of judicial review 
should be assessed by empirical scholarship.  If correlation and 
causation are proved between diversity and the practice of judi-
cial review in a democracy, then further thought should be given 
to any normative consequences that may flow from that con-
clusion beyond the basic need for judicial review. 
III.  PROHIBITION, JIM CROW, AND UNEQUAL EFFECTS 
This Part discusses how Churchill’s disdain for Prohibition 
led to his epiphany that the unequal distribution of constitu-
tional principles can harm constitutional authority.123  To make 
that claim, he drew a direct connection between the failure of the 
Eighteenth Amendment and the impotence of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in the 1920s.  In both cases, Churchill wrote that an 
overwhelming majority with honorable motives was undone by 
enacting a broad reform that was too unevenly spread.124  The 
result of that unequal spread was that the political support 
needed to sustain the constitutional rule could not be main-
tained.  Churchill’s holistic observation about law’s practical 
limits supports one explanation for Reconstruction’s weakness 
before the 1960s and provides a justification for some anti-
majoritarian features in the American constitutional structure.125  
A. The Bootlegger and the Klansman  
Fresh off a lecture tour of the United States in 1929, 
Churchill wrote an op-ed in The Daily Telegraph outlining his 
 
123 Churchill’s view of Prohibition was probably influenced by his beverage 
tastes. See JENKINS, supra note 2, at 356 (stating that Churchill “did not drink as 
much as he was commonly thought to do, although this is not incompatible with his 
being a fairly heavy and consistent imbiber”); see also Prohibition and Civil Liberties 
(Mar. 17, 1930), in 5 CHURCHILL SPEECHES, supra note 1, at 4726, 4726–27 (“[T]here 
is one feature of the prohibition movement which excites my indignation. There are 
still people in the United States who obtain indulgence in alcoholic liquor, and 
among those people I heard the expression ‘hooch’ sometimes used. It caused me 
great pain. What an expression to describe one of the gifts of the gods to man.”). 
124 Prohibition, supra note 8. 
125 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 100–02 (2004) 
(explaining how the “Great Migration” of Blacks from the South to the North 
promoted civil rights); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534–36, 556–57 
(2013) (invalidating the preclearance coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act in 
part because not all parts of the nation were covered). 
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views on Prohibition.  “The attempt of the Legislature to prevent 
by a stroke of the pen 120,000,000 persons from drinking spirits, 
wines, or even beer,” Churchill said, “is the most amazing exhibi-
tion alike of the arrogance and of the impotence of a majority 
that the history of representative institutions can show.”126  He 
then added that  
[t]he extreme self-assertion which leads an individual to impose 
his likes and dislikes upon others, the spasmodic workings of 
the electoral machine, the hysteria of wartime on the home 
front, and the rat-trap rigidity of the American Constitution 
have combined to produce on a gigantic scale a spectacle at once 
comic and pathetic.127  
Churchill also told the British public that “[m]illions of people of 
every class who vote dry, and thereby assume moral responsi-
bility for all that the attempted enforcement of Prohibition 
involves, do not hesitate to procure and consume alcoholic 
beverages whenever they require them.”128  
Churchill then reflected upon what this state of affairs said 
about majority rule in a constitutional democracy.  “Obviously,” 
he began, “there are limitations upon the power of legislative 
majorities.  It is easy to pass a law.”129  In considering those in-
trinsic limits, leaders must realize that  
[n]o folly is more costly than the folly of intolerant idealism.  
Follies which tend towards vice encounter at every stage in free 
and healthy communities enormous checks and correctives from 
the inherent goodness and sanity of human nature; but follies 
 
126 Prohibition, supra note 8. 
127 Id. The point about wartime hysteria was astute, as many observers at-
tribute the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to anti-German sentiment direct-
ed at brewers who were almost exclusively of German descent. See AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 416 (2005); see also DANIEL OKRENT, 
LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 100 (2010) (quoting a pro-
Prohibition activist who argued in 1918: “We have German enemies across the 
water . . . . We have German enemies in this country too. And the worst of all our 
German enemies, the most treacherous, the most menacing, are Pabst, Schlitz, 
Blatz, and Miller.”). 
128 Prohibition, supra note 8; see id. (“Such a divorce between the civic act and 
private conduct would only be possible in a sphere where the vote of the legislative 
institution did not correspond to the moral convictions and deep-seated habits of the 
nation.”). 
129 Id. 
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sustained by lofty ideas go far, and set up strange and sinister 
reactions.130 
He added that  
[a] law which does not carry with it the assent of public opinion 
or command the convictions of the leading elements in a 
community may endure, but cannot succeed; and under modern 
conditions in a democratic country it must, in the process of 
failure, breed many curious and dangerous evils.131 
He then made what initially looks like a shocking compar-
ison between Prohibition and the absence of Black suffrage in the 
South during the 1920s.  Here is the relevant passage in full:  
The melancholy era which followed the victory of the North 
in the American Civil War affords a glaring example.  Inspired 
by the noblest ideals—the abolition of slavery—animated by 
fierce war hatred and party lust, the conquerors decreed that 
[B]lack and white should vote on equal terms throughout the 
Union, and the famous Fifteenth Amendment was added to the 
Constitution of the United States.  Overwhelming force was at 
their disposal, with every disposition to use it against the 
prostrate and disarmed Confederacy.  The North were no more 
inconvenienced by the voting of a few handfuls of [Black people] 
scattered among their large population, and being outvoted on 
all occasions, than is a teetotaler by Prohibition.  
But the South had different feelings.  After years of waste, 
friction, and actual suffering, the Fifteenth Amendment was 
reduced by a persistent will-power of the minority and through 
many forms of artifice and violence to a dead letter.  The South-
ern [Black people] have the equal political rights it was the 
boast of the Constitution to accord them; but for two 
generations it has been well understood that they are not to use 
them in any State or District where they would make any 
difference.132 
Churchill concluded that “[a]s with the Fifteenth, so will it be 
with the Eighteenth Amendment.”133 
 
130 Id.; see id. (“When standards of conduct or morals which are beyond the 
normal public sentiment of a great community are professed and enforced, the 
results are invariably evasion, subterfuge, and hypocrisy.”). 
131 Id. (invoking the Declaration of Independence by asking whether it is 
“necessary for the purposes of ‘life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness’ that vast sums 
of money should be spent, and hordes of officials employed against sober and 
responsible citizens who wish to do no more than drink wine or beer as they would in 
any other country in the civilized world”). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
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There is a great deal to unpack here, but let us begin with 
the racist premises underlying Churchill’s history of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.134  In the 1920s, the dominant view of white 
historians was that Reconstruction was an exercise in Northern 
vengeance characterized by rampant graft.135  This scholarship, 
with an assist from the silent film Birth of a Nation, fixed on “the 
national consciousness an image of Reconstruction as a disas-
trous error, an era of misgovernment and corruption, the lowest 
point in the saga of American democracy.”136  Indeed, when Ron 
Chernow published his acclaimed biography of Ulysses S. Grant 
in 2017, Grant’s Administration remained tarnished by a reputa-
tion for incompetence and corruption that was a favorite 
narrative of Southern apologists for Jim Crow.137  From this my-
thology, Churchill absorbed the idea that Reconstruction was 
motivated in part by “fierce war hatred and party lust” and 
produced “waste, friction, and actual suffering” among Southern 
whites.138  It is hard to fault him for relying on the conventional 
wisdom, though given his own positive views of white supremacy 
he was clearly not a skeptic here as on other issues.139  
 
134 See WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 4 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
PEOPLES: THE GREAT DEMOCRACIES 306–13 (1958); see id. at 310–11 (“[Black men] 
voters were in a majority in five states. Yet the [Black man] was merely the dupe of 
his ill-principled white leaders.”).  
135 The first devastating response to this consensus did not come until later. See 
W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE 
PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 329, 648–49 (Transaction Publishers 2013) (1935). 
136 Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction—and Vice-
Versa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1589 (2012); see Justin Collings, The Supreme 
Court and the Memory of Evil, 71 STAN. L. REV. 265, 292–94 (2019) (exploring the 
influence of the racist “Dunning School” of Reconstruction history on the Court’s 
opinions); see also KLARMAN, supra note 125, at 66 (“The tremendous popularity of 
D.W. Griffith’s epic film Birth of a Nation (1915), which glorified the Confederacy, 
vilified Reconstruction, and portrayed blacks as ‘women chasers and foul fiends,’ 
typified the national racial mood.”). 
137 See RON CHERNOW, GRANT 856 (2017) (“For a long time after the Civil War, 
under the influence of southern historians, Reconstruction was viewed as a cata-
strophic error, a period of corrupt carpetbag politicians and illiterate black 
legislators, presided over by the draconian rule of U.S. Grant.”). 
138 See Prohibition, supra note 8; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
139 See, e.g., LARRY P. ARNN, CHURCHILL’S TRIAL: WINSTON CHURCHILL AND THE 
SALVATION OF FREE GOVERNMENT 104 (2015) (describing Kenyans in 1906 as “light-
hearted, tractable, if brutish children . . . capable of being instructed and raised from 
their present degradation” (alteration in original) (quoting WINSTON SPENCER 
CHURCHILL, MY AFRICAN JOURNEY 37–38 (1909))); see also id. (“The Indians of East 
Africa are mainly of a very low class of coolies, and the idea that they should be put 
on an equality with the Europeans is revolting to every white man throughout 
British Africa.” (quoting Letter from Winston S. Churchill to Edwin Montagu 
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Nonetheless, Churchill’s account of how the Fifteenth Amend-
ment unraveled was not a whitewash and connects up with an 
important point that is stressed by modern work on Reconstruc-
tion.140  He noted that there were few Blacks in the North in 1870 
and therefore the effect of the suffrage extension was sharply 
different in each region.141  Why did this disparity matter?  Part 
of the answer is that white Southerners were eager to resist this 
constitutional requirement.142  The other is that white North-
erners were less eager to defend the requirement because there 
was no natural political constituency in those states for doing 
so—in other words, Black voters.143  In other words, the Fifteenth 
Amendment created a large unequal effect that proved fatal to its 
enforcement.144  This disparity did not change until the Great 
Migration of Blacks from the South to the North began after 
World War I.145  Over time, the presence of more Black people in 
the North put pressure on politicians there—who needed their 
votes—to take stronger action on voting rights and enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment.146 
 
(October 8, 1921), in 10 THE CHURCHILL DOCUMENTS: CONCILIATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, APRIL 1921–NOVEMBER 1922, 1644 (Martin Gilbert ed., 1977))). 
140 See Prohibition, supra note 8. Churchill did not mince words about the fact 
that the South used trickery and violence to nullify Black suffrage. Id. (observing 
correctly that the Fifteenth Amendment was a legal fiction in the South by the 
1920s). 
141 See id. Churchill described this with the pejorative expression that Northern 
whites were not “inconvenienced” by Black voting in their states. See id.  
142 See ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF 
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 37–38 (2010). 
143 KLARMAN, supra note 125, at 12. 
144 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which contained a less coercive 
means to produce Black suffrage in the South, fared no better. See, e.g., Gerard N. 
Magliocca, Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
774, 788–90 (2018) (providing some background on Section 2).  
145 See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 125, at 100 (stating that the Great Migra-
tion’s “contribution to . . . racial change was substantial” because “they [Black men] 
relocated from a region of pervasive disenfranchisement to one that extended 
suffrage without racial restriction.”). 
146 See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 80 (1999); see also MCCULLOUGH, supra note 65, at 590 (quoting a political 
memorandum to President Truman advising him that “the northern [Black] vote 
today holds the balance of power in Presidential elections for the simple arithmetical 
reason that [Black people] not only vote in a block but are geographically 
concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral states such as New 
York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan”). 
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In a sense, Churchill was making a public choice claim about 
the Constitution before public choice theory was first articulated.147  
Public choice theorists argue, in part, that elected officials tend 
to enact policies with concentrated benefits for a relatively small 
group and diffuse costs for everyone else because that combina-
tion yields a stable base of support.148  Those receiving the 
benefits have a strong incentive to maintain the policy and can 
organize more easily to express that support.149  Meanwhile, 
those bearing the costs find organizing harder (due to their 
numbers) and lack a strong motive to act.  Churchill was describ-
ing the contrary situation.  The costs of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment were concentrated—in the South—and the benefits outside 
of the South were diffuse.  In that sort of case, resisting the law 
is much easier and more probable while sustained enforcement is 
more challenging and less likely.150  Granting suffrage to Black 
men in the South created a concentrated benefit for them, of 
course, but they could not defend their rights against violent 
local whites without significant support from the North.  
Churchill’s other original thought was that the Fifteenth and 
the Eighteenth Amendments suffered from a similar defect.151  
Prohibition also skewed sharply along geographic lines, even 
though the divide there was between cities that supported drink-
ing and rural areas that did not.152  A broader point in Churchill’s 
op-ed was that a ban on alcohol consumption created an unequal 
effect because teetotalers were unaffected by that policy, but the 
people who enjoyed drinking were fighting mad.  Once again, this 
led to a yawning enforcement gap, as the minority was willing to 
 
147 Public choice theory is often credited to a 1951 book by Kenneth J. Arrow, 
who later won the Nobel Prize in Economics. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).  
148 See, e.g., W. Michael Schuster, Public Choice Theory, the Constitution, and 
Public Understanding of the Copyright System, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2247, 2252 
(2018).  
149 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 7 (1965) (laying out the basic framework for organized 
action). 
150 This is only true if the group bearing the costs is sufficiently large. When 
those targeted by regulation are individuals or very small groups, any unequal bur-
den may instead raise constitutional fairness concerns. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting bills of attainder). 
151 Another link between the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendments is that they 
were both the immediate products of a major war, which may explain why elected 
officials did not fully appreciate the enforcement issues that would ensue. See supra 
text accompanying note 127.  
152 See OKRENT, supra note 127, at 104.  
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defy openly the Constitution, but the majority was unwilling to 
bear the cost of defense. 
B. Addressing Sharply Unequal Constitutional Effects 
Read in light of Churchill’s comments on Prohibition and on 
the Fifteenth Amendment, the Constitution’s provisions imped-
ing pure majority rule look better because they may help confer 
constitutional legitimacy.153  A goal of the legislative process 
should be to ensure that Article V amendments or broad consti-
tutional constructions rest on as equal a distribution of public 
opinion as possible.154  The oft-criticized Senate, which gives each 
state two votes notwithstanding its population, serves that pur-
pose by increasing the chances that a proposal will have support 
that is geographically spread throughout the country.155  The 
high hurdle of Article V, which provides that a supermajority of 
the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the state 
legislatures or conventions must agree for the ratification of a 
constitutional amendment, does the same.156 
With respect to slavery, the Framers took this burden-
spreading idea one step further.  The Direct Tax Clauses, which 
were designed to make the federal taxation of enslaved people 
more difficult, accomplished that object through the requirement 
that the costs of a slave tax could not be concentrated.157  These 
 
153 The Takings Clause also equalizes the burden of legislation by forcing the 
state to pay for projects rather than to concentrate the costs on individual property 
owners. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”); Calabresi, supra note 12, at 93. 
154 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A 
Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 10–13 (2018) (giving an overview of 
constitutional constructions). At some point, of course, a lack of majority support 
poses its own legitimacy problems. The point is that majority support and observing 
the proper forms do not, standing together, make a constitutional reform stick. 
155 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. The House of Representatives (uninten-
tionally) reflects this principle as well; each state, no matter its population, is 
entitled to at least one representative, which results in those states being 
overrepresented as compared to the largest states. See Jeffrey W. Ladewig, One 
Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and Constitutional 
Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2011). The Senate filibuster with 
respect to legislation also arguably serves the goal of ensuring that constitutional 
constructions rest on equally distributed support, though I continue to believe that 
the filibuster should be suspensory rather than absolute. See Magliocca, supra note 
13, at 304–05 (using the House of Lords as a model). 
156 See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
157 See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers.”); see also id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, 
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clauses state that a capitation, or head, tax must be collected 
from every state according to its respective population.158  This 
meant that a federal slave tax would also be paid by taxpayers in 
states without enslaved people.  Thus, a slave tax would not 
create concentrated costs on slaveowners in the slave states and 
diffuse benefits in free states that would benefit from slave tax 
revenue without paying the tax.  Instead, a slave tax would be 
distributed in an equal way across the nation.  Not surprisingly, 
Congress imposed a slave tax only once, in 1798, and the tax was 
only fifty cents per slave.159  
One way of viewing these power-sharing arrangements is as 
early forms of consociationalism.  Consociationalism refers to a 
constitution that gives formal rights and veto power to minority 
groups.160  The idea behind such a design is that majoritarianism 
and individual rights—even when supplemented by tolerance 
norms—may not provide adequate assurance for some distinctive 
minorities.161  Another justification is that, in diverse nations, the 
absence of formal minority trumps will lead to badly unstable 
 
or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration 
herein before directed to be taken.”). On the link between the Direct Tax Clauses 
and slavery, see Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177 (1796) (opinion of 
Patterson, J.). See also Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 158 U.S. 601, 684 (1895) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Clauses were “originally designed to protect 
slave property against oppressive taxation”); id. at 687 (Brown, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the Direct Tax Clauses were “adopted for a special and temporary 
purpose, that passed away with the existence of slavery”). 
158 Prior to the abolition of slavery, state populations for direct taxes were 
calculated through a complex formula that included the infamous Three-Fifths 
Clause for slaves. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that apportionment “shall be 
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons”). 
159 See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 543 (1869).  
160 See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 5 (1977) 
(providing the first academic assessment of this governance structure); see also 
Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional 
Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV 1445, 1520 (2016) (“Consociationalism involves consti-
tutional design for societies divided along social, ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, 
and uses entrenched structures such as federalism, power sharing executives, and 
proportional representation to ensure the representation of different groups.”). 
161 The intellectual godfather of this approach was John C. Calhoun, who de-
veloped his theory of “concurrent majorities”—in other words, allowing a majority of 
a minority to block a national majority—because he thought that the Constitution 
did not provide enough security for slavery. See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION 
ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 35 (1851). 
2020] CHURCHILL ON THE CONSTITUTION 747 
constitutional law.162  On this point, there is a link between 
Churchill’s claim about the need for judicial review in diverse 
states and his concern about the two constitutional amendments 
that were ratified over the objections of a minority with intense 
preferences.  In both cases, he was posing the basic question 
about whether a majority has “a right to do anything which it can 
get voted by the legislature.”163  Put another way, the diversity in 
a society may become so great that the agreement of a broader 
range of interests is required for constitutional legitimacy.  
Federalism is another structural feature that helps span this 
divide.  By allowing each state to have a different rule on certain 
issues, federalism creates a closer fit between a policy preference 
and the political will needed to enforce that preference on a 
disgruntled minority.  A state majority is generally more capable 
of enforcing its law over a state minority than a national majority 
over state majorities.  An even better match comes if a state pur-
sues federalism within its political or geographic subdivisions.164  
Prohibition provides a fine—though belated—example, as after 
the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment some states allowed 
each county to decide for itself on alcohol consumption.165  
Given that the Constitution contains safeguards that pre-
vent a constitutional amendment from being ratified when its 
concentrated costs and diffuse benefits might render enforcement 
problematic, how did the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendments 
become law?  One answer is that the Fifteenth Amendment was 
proposed during the absence of some of the ex-Confederate states 
from Congress.166  Furthermore, these same states were required 
to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment for readmission to the 
Union.167  As a result, a more lopsided base of support was used 
to obtain ratification due to the special circumstances that fol-
lowed the Civil War.  For the Eighteenth Amendment, the prob-
lem was that many of the state legislatures that voted for 
 
162 Whether consociationalism actually reduces social strife is a question that is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
163 THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra note 5, at 271. 
164 See generally Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010) (exploring different aspects of this question). 
165 See, e.g., Andrew J. Miller, Crafting a Better Industry: Addressing Problems 
of Regulation in the Craft Beer Industry, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV.1353, 1363. 
166 See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776–2015, at 179 (2016). 
167 See id. at 181 (listing those states as Mississippi, Texas, Virginia, and 
Georgia). 
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ratification were malapportioned in a way that greatly under-
stated their urban population.168  Indeed, the Twenty-First 
Amendment used a ratification mode of state conventions rather 
than state legislatures to avoid this distortion.169  For the Eight-
eenth Amendment as well, then, the normal democratic checks 
within the Article V process were weaker. 
Accordingly, Churchill’s comparison of the Fifteenth and 
Eighteenth Amendments yields important insights into the struc-
ture and function of the Constitution.  Democracy, even when 
supported by a supermajority, is not a sufficient condition for 
constitutional success.  We must “[recognize] the imperfections 
which vitiate even the best representative institutions” and ac-
cept the need for a relatively equal distribution of constitutional 
law.170  
CONCLUSION 
Winston Churchill was not fond of lawyers.  Speaking in 1926 
to colonial leaders of the British Empire, he said that their 
“discussion of . . . constitutional points . . . is healthy, natural, 
and timely, and absolutely appropriate to the occasion, so long as 
the discussion is carried on, as it would be, between colleagues 
and friends, apart from people such as lawyers who were seeking 
to find difficulties.”171  Later, in an op-ed on the Magna Carta, he 
wrote: “King John was the kind of tyrant most obnoxious to 
England.  He was a legal expert.”172  But lawyers were fond of 
Churchill.  As Chief Justice Earl Warren said in a tribute follow-
ing the former Prime Minister’s speech to the ABA, he did “more 
to subordinate brute force to the rule of law than any man of our 
time.”173  
Churchill’s extensive commentary on our Constitution opens 
up several fruitful avenues for research.  The first involves the 
relationship between the uncodified British Constitution and the 
unwritten aspects of America’s higher law.  Considerable atten-
 
168 See OKRENT, supra note 127, at 104–05; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 565−66 (1964) (holding that state legislative malapportionment violates the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
169 See AMAR, supra note 127, at 416–17; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 3 
(specifying ratification by state conventions). 
170 Prohibition, supra note 8. 
171 The Empire, supra note 74. 
172 Winston S. Churchill, The Greatest Half-Hour in Our History, DAILY MAIL, 
Apr. 13, 1934, at 12. 
173 The Law Society’s Dinner, supra note 97, at 951. 
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tion is paid to how the Framers were influenced by the examples 
of the Crown and Parliament when they wrote the text, but far 
too little is given to how the subsequent evolution of British 
constitutional practice shaped our construction of the text.174  
Indeed, most of Churchill’s analysis was based on a comparison 
of Britain and the United States in the twentieth century.  This 
Article illustrates the benefits of that approach and the need for 
more work along those lines.  A second open question involves 
Churchill’s hypothesis that diversity and judicial review are 
connected.  International or intrastate studies with appropriate 
controls can determine if diversity can explain the frequency or 
intensity of judicial review.  If such a link can be established, 
then further thought should be given to how that point may 
relate to appropriate procedures for constitutional amendment.  
Third, Churchill’s discussion of Reconstruction and Prohibition 
raises the question of how the unequal distribution of a 
constitutional principle can detract from that principle’s 
authority.  More broadly, Churchill’s thought should inform con-
stitutional reforms to make them durable by, perhaps, fashioning 
them more narrowly or more evenly. 
Lastly, Churchill’s constitutional observations illustrate the 
virtue of thinking through America’s entire legal experience and 
not just those rare moments where the bulk of that text was 
drafted and ratified.  His was a very British sensibility in line 
with the gradual evolution of his nation’s political order since 
time immemorial.  As Churchill said on the eve of Elizabeth II’s 
coronation in 1953: “Like nature we follow in freedom the paths 
of variety and change and our faith is that the mercy of God will 
make things . . . better if we all try our best.”175   
 
 
174 For example, the tradition of designating the President’s closest advisors as 
“the Cabinet” and sometimes giving the Cabinet a special status is drawn from 
Britain and not from anything in the text of the original Constitution. Cf. Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169–70 (1803) (making the first Supreme Court 
reference to the heads of the Executive Department as the Cabinet). 
175 The Crown and Parliament, supra note 45. 
